SUMMARY
Hospital-acquired hepatitis A is not common. When it does occur the index patient is usually either a child without any obvious signs of the infection or an adult admitted to hospital with an initial diagnosis unrelated to hepatitis A 1, 2 . Diarrhoea or faecal incontinence during the period of peak virus shedding facilitates the spread of the virus, and is an important risk factor for the nosocomial transmission of hepatitis A virus (HAV) 1, 2 . This report concerns an outbreak of seven cases of hepatitis A that occurred in a six-bed ICU in a regional hospital in North Queensland, Australia. The outbreak included two patients, two close contacts of the index patients, and three of the ICU nursing staff. It is likely that inadequate precautions taken whilst handling the index patient's bile initiated the outbreak.
METHODS
A diagnosis of hepatitis A in a patient in North Queensland is notified by the relevant laboratory to the Tropical Public Health Unit in Cairns. The Unit then contacts the patient's medical practitioner, and usually the patient, to determine whether any specific public health interventions are required.
In the outbreak reported here there were delays in diagnosing hepatitis A in the index patient (see below) and notifying the infection in the first two nurses. However once the hospital authorities became aware of the outbreak, they requested a formal investigation to determine the modes of transmission of HAV within the ICU.
The onset of clinical hepatitis A was defined as the date upon which dark urine was first noted. Hepatitis A IgM was confirmed by a commercial microparticle enzyme immunoassay (HAVAB-M ® , Abbott Diagnostics, Chicago, U.S.A.). Details of clinical features, dates of admission and onset of hepatitis A, and patient movements, procedures and laboratory results were obtained from the medical records of the two ICU patients.
The three nurses were interviewed to ascertain whether they had any obvious risk factors for hepatitis A 3 , and then to review their work practices, particularly in connection with caring for the index patient. Details of procedures, both general and directly pertaining to the cases, were obtained through interviews with ICU nursing and medical staff, and from the ICU Procedure Manual. Blood samples were collected from all permanent ICU nursing staff to determine whether there were any subclinical cases.
RESULTS
Index case: The index case was a 23-year-old male who was admitted to the ICU on March 13, 1995 with an intentional overdose of paracetamol and flucloxacillin and abdominal trauma following a motor vehicle accident. He had a laparotomy on the day of admission. A duodenal tear was repaired and a cholecystotomy, with a biliary drainage tube, performed. There was some initial improvement, and within two days he was transferred to a surgical ward. However, his condition deteriorated markedly, and a week after admission he developed an acute abdomen with septic shock and adult respiratory distress syndrome. Acute pancreatitis was diagnosed at a second laparotomy, gastrojejunostomy and feeding jejunostomy were performed, and he was transferred back to the ICU. There he remained critically ill for several weeks.
Virtually from the day of admission the patient had elevated liver enzymes as a result of multi-organ failure and/or the potential hepatoxicity of his medications and original overdose ("ICU jaundice") 4 . However four weeks after admission (and two days after discharge from the ICU), his liver enzymes became grossly elevated and he became jaundiced; hepatitis A was only serologically confirmed after recognition of four related cases three to four weeks later.
Outbreak cases: The index patient's mother and his female partner both became unwell, with an illness serologically confirmed as hepatitis A, 27 days after the probable date of onset of the hepatitis A in the patient. The first two nurses (Nurses A and B) became ill, with what was serologically confirmed as hepatitis A, 28 and 35 days after their last contact with the index patient ( Figure 1) .
The second patient, a 50-year-old male, was admitted to the ICU 48 hours after the index patient had been discharged from the ICU. He had severe pneumonia of unknown aetiology and ultimately required ventilation via a tracheostomy. His illness was complicated by multi-organ failure with adult respiratory distress syndrome and acute renal failure requiring dialysis.
Although he too had mildly elevated liver enzymes from the time of admission, they became grossly elevated 42 days after admission. The clinical picture was confused because the sudden rise in his liver enzyme levels occurred within 48 hours of commencing phenytoin following a generalized seizure. The phenytoin was ceased and carbamazepine introduced, but the liver enzymes deteriorated further, and hepatitis A was then serologically confirmed. The third nurse (Nurse C) became ill, with what was proven to be hepatitis A, 69 days after the probable onset of hepatitis A in the index case. No subclinical case was detected in any of the other ICU nursing staff.
Investigation of modes of transmission:
The index patient developed clinical hepatitis after 26 days in hospital, and therefore it is plausible that he acquired the infection from within the hospital. However none of the other patients who were in the ICU during the first 33 days of his hospitalization (i.e. until he was no longer infectious), and none of the patients who were also in the surgical ward during his five-day stay there were subsequently notified as having hepatitis A. Although on rare occasion hepatitis A can be transmitted via a blood transfusion 5 , not one of the four donors of the blood which the index patient received prior to the onset of his hepatitis A developed hepatitis A after the time of donation (Dr I. Young, Red Cross Blood Transfusion Service, Queensland Division, personal communication).
The index patient had neither diarrhoea nor faecal incontinence during the time he was infectious. However, for several weeks following the second laparotomy, bile was aspirated from the drainage bag attached to the cholecystotomy tube, mixed with a high-calorie formula, and every two hours introduced to the patient via the feeding jejunostomy tube. The remainder of the bile was decanted into a measuring jug, and discarded after the volume was measured. The two female contacts of the index case did not live in the same household and had no other obvious risk factors for hepatitis A. They both regularly visited the patient in the ICU, and although they both assisted with his general care, they did not routinely wear gloves during such contacts.
The first two nurses had contact with the index patient during his period of maximum communicability, and both nurses subsequently developed hepatitis A after approximately the average duration (28-30 days) of the incubation period of hepatitis A (15 to 50 days) 6 . The two nurses did not have social contact with each other outside work, and Nurse A had no other obvious risk factors for hepatitis A. Although Nurse B had a 16-month-old child attending a child day-care centre there was no other case of hepatitis A associated within the centre over the next three months, suggesting that HAV was not circulating in the centre and that Nurse B had indeed acquired hepatitis A from within the ICU.
The two nurses both worked on night-shift in the ICU where they had provided one-on-one care for the index patient, and both were involved in collecting and "re-cycling" his bile. They routinely wore gloves for this purpose, yet upon interview they acknowledged that it was a very awkward procedure so that minute splashes or spillage of bile could have occurred resulting in microscopic contamination of surfaces or fomites.
The maximum incubation period of hepatitis A is 50 days 6 so the second patient probably acquired the infection from within the ICU. Although the two patients were not in the ICU at the same time, the second patient was placed on admission (to the ICU) on the same bed as that vacated 48 hours previously by the index patient. Upon interview, some ICU nursing staff commented that the design of the bed was such that it was difficult to clean, and that the cleaning often seemed inadequate. It is also possible that he acquired the infection from Nurse A. She cared for him during her period of maximum communicability on a shift one day before she became ill. However, the workload he required at the time was not particularly demanding and she routinely wore gloves for this purpose anyway.
Nurse C also worked on night-shift in the ICU where she too had provided one-on-one care for the index patient. However her last contact with the index patient was 69 days prior to the onset of her illness. This interval well exceeds the maximum incubation period of hepatitis A, indicating that it is most unlikely that she acquired the infection directly from the index patient.
There are three possible ways in which she could have become infected: 1. She had a three-year-old who attended a child day care facility. However because he was toilettrained and because no other centre-associated cases were recognized in the following three months, we consider it unlikely that Nurse C acquired HAV from the centre via her son. 2. She had, however, nursing contact with the second patient 28 days before she became ill. The contact was just prior to the onset of his illness, at a time when he would have been highly infectious. The patient had "loose" bowel motions at the time, and upon interview, she considered it quite feasible that, for example, she had handled, ungloved, his bed linen. 3. Although Nurse C did not have social contact with the other two nurses outside work, she had contact with them while working night-shift in the ICU. In particular she had contact during Nurse B's period of maximum communicability, raising the possibility of nurse-to-nurse transmission of hepatitis A. The ICU staff usually use a tea-room adjacent to the ICU during scheduled tea-breaks. On night-shift, however, a food-trolley bearing beverages and food was routinely sited within the ICU patient-care area. The trolley was usually prepared by an ICU nurse, and involved the preparation and serving of salads and cold meats. Staff therefore had ready access to beverages and food from the trolley without having to remove gowns etc, and without having to leave the ICU. Several of the ICU nurses interviewed acknowledged taking food from the trolley while still caring for a patient, and without necessarily having washed hands before doing so.
DISCUSSION
This outbreak of hepatitis A is typical of hospital outbreaks in that the index case was probably incubating the infection upon admission, he required high dependency care, and he had an underlying condition that delayed the recognition of the infection [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . However, it was atypical in that the index patient had neither diarrhoea nor faecal incontinence 1,2,7-14 . Because there was intensive handling of his bile, we consider it (rather than faeces) as the most likely body-fluid vehicle for the transmission of HAV from the index patient. HAV is excreted in bile in high titres 15 , and a case of hepatitis A following exposure to bile has been previously described 14 . Therefore bile is potentially infectious, and handling bile requires "body substance isolation" precautions 16 .
We believe that the second patient somehow acquired hepatitis A from a contaminated fomite, either the bed or support equipment adjacent to the bed, such as infusion pumps and monitors. A case of hospital-acquired hepatitis A in a child who occupied an isolation room after an index case has been described elsewhere 7 . The infecting dose from such a source is likely to be lower than that from direct person-to-person transmission. As an inverse relationship between log infecting dose and incubation period has been described for hepatitis A 17 , a relatively low infecting dose was probably the reason for his long incubation period (42 days). At room temperature HAV can retain its infectivity on inert environmental surfaces for several weeks 18 , and therefore the design of hospital equipment including beds must allow for thorough cleaning. The bed concerned here was of an old style with exposed mechanics that did not facilitate such thoroughness, and is no longer in use in the ICU. Nevertheless, thorough terminal cleaning of equipment must be a routine practice so as to minimize the risk of transmission of infectious diseases from fomites to patients and staff.
It is clear that the third nurse did not acquire hepatitis A from the index patient, but rather represents a second generation of transmission that occurred within the ICU. We believe that she acquired HAV by transferring infectious material (from the second patient) on her hands, via food consumed in the patient-care area, into her mouth. (Although it is possible that she acquired HAV from food contaminated by the other nurses during its preparation, such contamination would be expected to result in a common-source outbreak rather than in only a single case 7 .) Direct patient-to-nurse transmission has been documented during numerous hospital outbreaks [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . Indeed, the risk of occupationally acquired hepatitis A among hospital personnel is greatest among nurses 1 , presumably reflecting their continuous and intimate contact with patients.
HAV virus can persist on hands for several hours 20 , and in food kept at room temperature for considerably longer 18 . Not surprisingly therefore eating food and drinking beverages on a hospital ward is associated with an increased risk of hepatitis A among hospital personnel 12, 13, 21 . Indeed, consuming food in a ward contravenes basic infection control procedure, and the food-trolley was removed from the ICU as soon as its possible link with the transmission of HAV was recognized. At the same time human normal immunoglobulin was offered as prophylaxis to the ICU staff in case further transmission had occurred via the food trolley 22 . No further ICU-associated cases occurred in the following three months. Ultimately, handwashing is the single most important means for preventing hepatitis A 1, 23 , and the two close contacts and the three nurses could only have acquired the infection through suboptimal handwashing practice. Although hepatitis A is usually a selflimiting illness it nevertheless causes considerable morbidity. Two of the nurses in this outbreak were hospitalized for a total of five days, and the three nurses were unable to resume work for a total of thirteen weeks following the acute phase of their illness. Moreover, some hospital-acquired enteric infections can be much more serious than hepatitis A 24 . However compliance with handwashing policies among hospital personnel is not infrequently suboptimal reflecting the difficulty of sustaining "routine" infection control practices 13, 25, 26 . In summary, this outbreak occurred because of lack of adherence to fundamental infection control practices: body substance isolation precautions were inadequate, terminal disinfection was not optimal, food was prepared and consumed in the ICU patientcare area, and handwashing was also inadequate. We can only agree that "unless basic infection control practices are used routinely, outbreaks such as those reported here will continue to occur" 23 . However this outbreak and recent reports from elsewhere 25, 26 , indicate just how difficult it is to implement and sustain apparently straightforward infection control practices such as handwashing. Perhaps the inactivated hepatitis A vaccine should be considered for ICU staff, as an ICU not only functions as a paediatric ward and an infectious diseases ward 27 , but it also regularly caters for patients with risk factors responsible for initiating outbreaks of hospital-acquired hepatitis A 1, 10, 12, 13 .
